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IMAGES OF EXPERTISE: CONVERGING DISCOURSES ON
THE USE AND ABUSE OF SCIENCE IN
MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA
DAVID S. CAUDILL*
While climate change is an interesting issue, it's not a legal
issue .... The Supreme Court only takes a few limited
cases every year, and this is just a vanilla exercise in statu-
tory interpretation .... 1
The reality is, a case is not going to be about - shouldn't
be about - science. If I was working for one side or the
other in [Massachusetts v. EPA], I'd be concerned about
presenting certain legal questions properly a lot more
than I'd be worried about what science is before the
Court.2
In October 1999, several organizations petitioned the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate, under the Clean Air
Act (CAA), carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles.3 In May 2001, as the public comment period on
the rulemaking petition closed, President George W. Bush re-
quested a National Research Council (NRC) review of the state of
global warming science. 4 In June 2003, as the EPA continued to
delay ruling on the 1999 petition, three state attorneys general sued
* Professor of Law and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova
University School of Law. This Article was presented as a paper on Nov. 11, 2006,
at the Villanova Environmental Law Journal Symposium entitled "Beating the
Heat: Regulating Greenhouse Gases to Curb Global Warming."
1. See Craig Welch, Seattle's Big Role in Fight on Global Warming, SEAT-rut TMES,
May 16, 2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/
2002996980_globalwarml6m.html (quoting Allison Wood) (suggesting U.S. Su-
preme Court would decline hearing Massachusetts v. EPA).
2. See Laura Fitzpatrick, The Jury on Global Warming, SEED, Aug. 3, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.seedmagazine.com/news/2006/08/the-jury-on-global-
warming.php?page=all (quoting Jonathan Adler, Case Western University law pro-
fessor) (expressing lack of concern regarding Court's potential engagement with
science of global warming).
3. See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to
None?, 35 ENv-L. L. 1, 65 (2005) (claiming these emissions are significantly con-
tributing to global climate change and EPA has duty to regulate them under CAA
section 202(a)).
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the EPA for failing in its duty to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.5
Relying on the uncertainty (with respect to the causes of global
warming) in the NRC report and concluding that carbon dioxide is
not an "air pollutant" under the CAA, the EPA denied the 1999
petition on the basis that the EPA lacked authority to regulate vehi-
cle emissions in September 2003.6 In October 2003, Massachusetts,
eleven other states, five governmental entities and fourteen envi-
ronmental organizations filed separate petitions, now consolidated
in Massachusetts v. EPA,7 challenging the EPA's denial. 8 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, having jurisdiction over chal-
lenges to final agency actions, ruled against the petitioners in April
2005,9 and after a rehearing en banc was denied, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted the petitioners review.1°
Massachusetts v. EPA is significant for many reasons beyond the
scope of this Article - the national debate over global warming
and its divisiveness (eleven states supported the EPA's right not to
regulate)II will heat up, the question of standing to sue will be ad-
dressed (and may preclude a decision on the merits), 12 and the
dispute over whether the EPA should identify carbon dioxide as a
pollutant under the CAA will be spotlighted in the popular press
and in scholarly journals.13 My own focus is on Massachusetts v. EPA
as a point of convergence for numerous contemporary discourses
concerning the intersection of law and science. Following a brief
5. See Massachusetts v. Whitman, No. 3:303CV984, (D. Conn. June 4, 2003);
see also The Office of Massachusetts Attorney General, Supreme Court To Hear Global
Warming Case November 29; Massachusetts and Coalition of 11 Other States Led by AG
Reilly Requested Court Review of Case Involving Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Pollutants,
available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=1234.
6. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) (providing notice of denial of petition for rulemaking); see
also Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 56-57; Mank, supra note 3, at 68-69 (attempt-
ing to resolve standing before proceeding to merits of case).
7. 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rehearing en banc, denied (2005), cert. granted
(2006) (writing for majority, Judge Randolph).
8. See Mank, supra note 3, at 8 (describing parties in suit).
9. See generally 415 F.3d. at 53 (finding section 307(b)(1) of Clean Air Act
gives court exclusive jurisdiction over "nationally applicable regulations promul-
gated, or final action taken, by the Administrator").
10. See generally 126 S. Ct. 2960 (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
11. See Welch, supra note 1, at 3 (identifying mostly western and midwestern
states).
12. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 54-55 (discussing issues of causation
and redressability in standing); see generally Mank, supra note 3 (finding no link
between harm to people directly from carbon dioxide emitted from cars).
13. See generally Janine Maney, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Climate Change, and the
Clean Air Act: An Analysis of Whether Carbon Dioxide Should Be Listed as a Criteria Pollu-
tant, 13 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 298 (2005).
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summary of the uncertainty with respect to the role of automobile
emissions in global warming, as reflected in the 2001 NRC report, I
identify and distinguish nine discourses or narratives that are rele-
vant to and implicated in Massachusetts v. EPA. The discourses I
identify overlap and run together to such a degree that they are
often not distinguished or even noticed in the blur of popular and
scholarly commentary on the place of science in law. All of them,
nevertheless, will likely feed into that lawsuit and feed off of
whatever happens to the suit in the U.S. Supreme Court.
I. UNCERTAINTY IN SCIENCE
[P] olicy makers... frequently have to weigh tradeoffs and
make decisions on important issues, despite the inevitable
uncertainties in our scientific understanding concerning
particular aspects [of global warming]. Science never has
all the answers.' 4
The disagreement between Circuit Judges Randolph and Tatel
in Massachusetts v. EPA15 over the uncertainty surrounding the
"causal linkage" between greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming 16 confirms the interpretive instability of scientific reports.
In deciding that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his dis-
cretion in declining to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles, 17 Judge Randolph noted that in
denying the rulemaking petition, EPA... decided to rely
on the [National Research] Council's "objective and inde-
pendent assessment of the relevant science."
The National Research Council concluded that "a
causal linkage" between greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming "cannot be unequivocally established"....
"[T]here is considerable uncertainty in current under-
standing of how the climate system varies naturally and re-
14. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALY-
SIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001), at vii, available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record-id=101398page=R7.html (providing succinct and balanced
overview of what science can currently say about potential for future climate
change, while outlining uncertainties that remain in our scientific knowledge).
15. See generally 415 F.3d 50.
16. See id. at 57-58 (asking if proof of direct link is required).
17. See id. at 56 (finding even though EPA concluded it did not have statutory
authority under CAA section 202(a) (1), court in Massachusetts v. EPA assumed ar-
guendo that it did and addressed whether EPA properly declined to exercise
authority).
3
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acts to emissions of greenhouse gases." This uncertainty is
compounded by the possibility for error inherent in the
assumptions necessary to predict future climate change.18
Although the petitioners claimed that the "EPA Administrator's re-
fusal to regulate rested entirely on [an invocation of] scientific un-
certainty," the court disagreed - "the Administrator relied on
many 'policy' considerations that... warranted regulatory forbear-
ance at this time," including risk assessment.1 9
Judge Tatel, in his dissent, read the NRC report differently.
For Judge Tatel, Judge Randolph "seize [d] on" the uncertainty im-
plied by the phrase "a causal linkage . . .cannot be unequivocally
established" without attending to the context of that phrase:
[T] his uncertainty ... appears little more than an applica-
tion of the principle that, as the NRC Report later puts it,
"[c]onfidence limits and probabilistic information, with
their basis, should always be considered as an integral part
of the information that climate scientists provide to policy
and decision makers." Indeed, the NRC Report goes on
to state that the "fact that the magnitude of the observed
warming is large compared to natural variability... is sug-
gestive of such a linkage" . . . though not "proof' of it.20
While the scope of future global warming may be uncertain, Judge
Tatel also doubted that the "EPA could credibly conclude that it
needs more research to determine whether [greenhouse gas]-
caused global warming 'may reasonably be anticipated to endanger'
welfare." 21 In any event, reasonable anticipation of danger is the
CAA standard to EPA determinations, not unequivocal proof.22
The Randolph-Tatel debate reveals two images of scientific ex-
pertise, each of which is characterized by representations of what
18. See id. at 57 (quoting CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE, supra note 14, at 17) (stat-
ing EPA relied on NRC's assessment that there was no link between greenhouse
gas emissions and global warming).
19. See id. at 58 (noting that EPA Administrator relied on these "policy" con-
siderations in addition to scientific uncertainty about causal effects of greenhouse
gases on future climate of earth).
20. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 63-64 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting
that Judge Randolph erroneously depicts uncertainty as applying to global warm-
ing, in general, rather than to more recent warming trends) (citations omitted).
21. See id. at 77 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (noting that EPA's silence on this point
is telling and looking at NRC Report as whole).
22. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that EPA may withhold endanger-
ment finding only if it needs more information to determine whether statutory
standard has been met).
4
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scientists do and what the law can reasonably expect from science.
The debate also echoes the charges: that the regulatory arena has
been "Daubert-ized;" that science can be used and abused for politi-
cal and economic reasons; that uncertainty can be manufactured to
delay regulation; that the Bush administration strategically de-
mands "sound science;" that science is misunderstood in law; and
that scientific advice must be disinterested in order to (1) stop reg-
ulatory abuse of business or (2) stop businesses from delaying regu-
lation. All of these charges, and the narratives that have supported
and repeated them over the last ten years, converge in Massachusetts
v. EPA and accompany the debate over regulation of greenhouse
gases to slow global warming.
II. NINE CONVERGING DISCOURSES
A. Two Images of Scientific Expertise
Judicial review of agency action, as in Massachusetts v. EPA, oc-
cupies a point of connection between the images of science that
prevail among judges and litigators, with respect to expert testi-
mony, and the images of science that prevail in the regulatory arena
among administrators and stakeholders, with respect to science ad-
visors. Following Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(Daubert),23 when commentators attempted to describe accurately
the new regime for admissibility decisions, they were faced with
some ambiguities - was Daubert more restrictive, i.e., was the stan-
dard represented by the "four factors" higher than in the past?
24
The text of Daubert included both an assurance that the new stan-
dard was generous toward admissibility and an emphasis on judicial
gatekeeping to ensure credible expertise.25 It was not until Daubert
was applied in the years following the opinion, that the meaning of
Daubert would become clearer. As it turns out, the meaning of
Daubert varies in accordance with individual judges - some are
generous, and some are restrictive - such that we can talk of the
meanings of Daubert.
In an effort to understand the Daubert regime, Professor L.H.
LaRue and I did a study of cases involving admissibility of experts in
23. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
24. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d. at 59-94 (holding so-called four factors for sci-
entific validity include testability, low error rate, peer-reviewed publications and
general acceptance).
25. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (con-
firming liberal thrust of Federal Rules of Evidence); see also id. at 593 (confirming
need for judicial assessment of scientific validity).
5
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federal courts, focusing on appellate opinions in which a trial
judge's admissibility decision (to adopt or reject an expert) was re-
versed on appeal. We summarized the results of that study in No
Magic Wand: The Idealization of Science in Law (2006), wherein we
identified two images of the scientific enterprise that were influen-
tial in assessing reliability of expertise: (1) some judges viewed sci-
ence as a modest, pragmatic endeavor that is characterized by
probabilistic conclusions, uncertainties, scientific disputes and a
history of refutations, reversals and revisions and (2) other judges
had a more romantic image of science as a producer of stable
knowledge, characterized by rigorous methodology, consensus and
certainty.
We went on to argue that the latter, idealized conception of
science, leads judges into two different types of errors. First, judges
who idealize science often become overly generous in admitting
highly-credentialed experts on that ground alone, even if their testi-
mony is otherwise flawed. Second, judges who idealize science,
conversely, become overly restrictive and reject the testimony of
(otherwise credible) experts who concede the uncertainties that are
inevitable in science. We concluded that judges with modest, non-
romantic images of science seem to make better admissibility deci-
sions - they do not expect too much from science, and they under-
stand that the inevitable, pragmatic features of all science do not
take anything away from scientific utility and progress.
Because the science that is offered by expert witnesses is the
same science used in policy debates and decisions, these two com-
peting images of science recur throughout the other discourses dis-
cussed below. Indeed, most of the critical discourses identified in
this Article rely in part on one of the two images of science. More-
over, the debate over the uncertainty in the NRC Report between
Judges Randolph and Tatel reflects the tensions between these two
views of science - with Judge Randolph idealizing science, and
Judge Tatel having more modest expectations in terms of scientific
certitude. ForJudge Tatel, the NRC Report is typical of science and
betrays the usual uncertainties.
Finally, both images of science co-exist in Daubert jurispru-
dence, and each can ground an evaluation of expertise, though the
resulting admissibility decision based on a modest, pragmatic image
of science may be the opposite of a decision based on an idealized
image of science. But when policy scholars speak about the
"Daubert-ization" of the regulatory arena, either to welcome that
framework or to criticize the importation of courtroom standards
6
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into policy debates, the reference is almost always to the idealized
view of science in Daubert jurisprudence.
B. The Daubert-ization of Agency Review
The impact of Daubert on the regulatory arena is not immedi-
ately clear. On the one hand, the distinction between administra-
tive action and the courtroom was recognized in amici curiae briefs
on both sides of the Daubert Supreme Court appeal. 26 On the other
hand, some believe that "the apparent importance of this distinc-
tion... has since declined if not evaporated." 27 To the extent that
Daubert in practice resulted in higher, more restrictive standards for
admissibility of expert testimony in trials, a parallel movement to-
ward higher standards for science in the regulatory arena is argua-
bly detectable. Some trace the origins of the regulatory sound
science movement, as well as data quality legislation for federal
agencies (both of which are discussed below), to the Daubert regime
generally.2 8
A more specific concern is the prospect of incorporating a
Daubert form ofjudicial review into administrative law, which Profes-
sor Thomas McGarity identifies as "a profoundly bad idea:" 29
"[J] udicial adoption of a regulatory Daubert approach will likely re-
sult in unconstrained regulatory policymaking by unaccountable
and scientifically illiterate judges and a much higher incidence of
judicial remands of important regulations."3 0 McGarity calls the
Daubert mandate, as refined by the obligation in Joiner for trial
courts "to evaluate the scientific validity of an expert's conclusions
as well as its basis, a "corpuscular approach" to admissibility.
"Under this approach, [a party] must establish the relevance and
reliability.., of each individual study on which [the party's] expert
26. See Roni A. Neff & Lynn R. Goldman, Regulatoiy Parallels to Daubert: Stake-
holder Influence, "Sound Science, "and the Delayed Adoption of Health-Protective Standards,
95 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH, Supp. 1, S81, at S85 (citing Brief for the American Society
of Law, Medicine and Ethics et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Daubert,
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), and Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council,
Inc., et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579
(1993) (No. 92-102)) (recognizing distinction between administrative action and
courtroom).
27. See Neff, supra note 26, at S85 (noting that distinction between administra-
tive action and courtroom action is not necessarily critical).
28. See id. (explaining that Daubert ruling was impetus for movement).
29. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Daubert and the Proper Role for Courts in Health,
Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Supp. 1, S92 (2005)
(admonishing against use of Daubert review in administrative law matters).
30. See id. at 94 (explaining that Daubert review would be unacceptable in reg-
ulatory matters).
7
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relies as well as the relevance and reliability of the expert's overall
conclusions." 31 In a toxic tort case, this "invites defendants to focus
on flaws in the corpuscles of data" rather than on overall reliability
and prevents an expert from using "the cumulative weight-of-the-
evidence approach that regulatory agencies universally employ in
assessing the risks" of toxic substances.3 2
Daubert-like judicial review of risk assessment, McGarity points
out, was resisted in the 1970s and 1980s.3 3 In Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Tyson,34 for example, the D.C. Court reviewing a
United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) rule rejected an industry trade as-
sociation's attack on
each piece of evidence [to suggest] that no individual
piece proves a relationship between [ethylene oxide] ex-
posure and various adverse health effects. This approach
disregards the marginal contribution that each piece of ev-
idence makes to the total picture .... OSHA need not
"prove" its assertions in [that] manner .... Our function
... is only to search for substantial evidence, not proof
positive.35
Likewise, in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,3 6 the en banc D.C. Circuit rejected
the petitioner's "apparent suggestion" that in its review of a deci-
sion to phase tetraethyl lead out of gasoline, the court should
seek a single dispositive study that fully supports the Ad-
ministrator's determination. Science does not work that
way; nor, for that matter, does adjudicatory factfinding
.... By its nature, scientific evidence is cumulative: the
31. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is
Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for
Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 KAN. L. REV. 897, 922 (citing Erica Beecher-
Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP.
L. REv. 55, 57, 69 (1998)) (explaining that Daubert approach when used in regula-
tory matters focuses court not on reliability of evidence but rather on potential
flaws in data, keeping otherwise good scientific evidence out).
32. See McGarity, supra note 29, at S95 (describing approach to determining
admissibility of expert testimony in toxic tort cases).
33. See id. at S96 (describing courts' responses to Daubert-like judicial review of
risk assessment).
34. 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
35. See id. (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d
1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
36. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
8
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more supporting albeit inconclusive, evidence available,
the more likely the accuracy of the conclusion.3 7
Such judicial restraint is, for McGarity, sensible and "altogether ap-
propriate" because (1) agencies attempting to answer in advance
"every question raised by outside commentators in scrupulous de-
tail" will be unable "to fulfill their congressionally delegated respon-
sibilities;" (2) agency scientists already tend to view evidence as
inadmissible or admissible, "'rather than taking a scientific ap-
proach to see what could be inferred from all of the available evi-
dence;"' (3) judges "do not always have a good sense for what is
relevant in complex rulemakings;" (4) judges "intent on reducing
the federal government's role in business activities" will be able to
make agencies more timid; (5) Daubert-izing judicial review will en-
courage industry to manufacture uncertainty; and (6) no scientific
"study is perfect [and risk] assessments are necessarily tentative
"38
Such recurring attention to the way science and scientists actu-
ally work (receptiveness to "scientific nuance" in McGarity's termi-
nology),39 rather than idealizing science as offering certainty or
"proof positive," echoes the notion of two judicial views concerning
the scientific enterprise - romantic versus modest. It is the latter,
pragmatic conception of science and its products that many view as
the target of a newly defined conservative assault on science.
C. The Political Rights' War on Science
The strategies Mooney details [in The Republican War on
Science (2005)] are not new, but they have been perfected
by savvy political advisors who claim the rhetorical high
ground ("sound science" versus 'Junk science"), exploit
marginal uncertainty and induce "analysis paralysis"
through seemingly endless demands for further studies. 40
Chris Mooney's critique of the conservative's politicization of
science, which even a sympathetic reviewer found "tedious," "self-
37. See id. (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc)).
38. See id. at S96-97. (quoting Mark. R. Powell, Science at the EPA: Information
in the Regulatory Process, WASHINGTON, D.C.: RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (1999)).
39. See McGarity, supra note 29, at S96 (commenting on effects of Daubert-
izing judicial review of administrative actions).
40. See Stuart W. Leslie, A Journalist Looks at the Assault on Science by the Political
Right, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 2005, sec. 14, at 6 (providing review of CHRIS MOONEY,
THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005)).
9
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righteous" and "surprisingly bland" in its curative recommenda-
tions, 41 presents the debate over the reduction of greenhouse gases
as an example of how right-wing politicians raise doubtful objec-
tions to scientific consensus (e.g., regarding global climate change
models). 42 As he was writing that book, Mooney published an arti-
cle on the Klamath River Basin controversy that exemplifies his con-
cerns.43 Although reports from the NRC (1995), the Ecological
Society of America (1996) and the General Accounting Office
(2003) concluded that actions taken pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) (including species listings and critical habitat leg-
islations) were generally scientifically sound, the Bureau of Recla-
mation's massive cut-off of irrigation water in 2001, to save three
species of fish during a drought in the Klamath River Basin, ignited
a controversy over the validity of ESA science. 44 A NRC interim re-
port in 2002 stated
that the decision to maintain higher water levels on Upper
Klamath Lake and higher Klamath River flow levels lacked
a "sound scientific basis." The committee couldn't find a
clear link between lake water levels or river flow and the
welfare of the two species of suckers or the coho salmon. 45
Much was made of the negative effects of the inadequacy of the
Bureau of Reclamation's science, including calls for ESA reform,
but some members of the committee thought their preliminary
analysis had been misinterpreted; the final report in 2003
explicitly repudiates the spin put out by some critics of the
... actions in the Klamath .... [One committee member
explained that while] there was "not sufficient evidence to
support what the agency did ... we never said that what
they did was a bad decision."
The distinction is crucial: In the face of scientific un-
certainty and insufficient evidence, the agencies exercised
41. See id. (criticizing Mooney's recommendation to depoliticize science).
42. See id. (summarizing Mooney's arguments).
43. See Chris Mooney, Sucker Punch: How Conservatives are Trying to Use a Con-
flict Over Obscure Fish to Gut the Science Behind the Endangered Species Act, LEGAL AF-
FAIRs, May/June 2004, at 23-25 (describing controversies over Endangered Species
Act).
44. See id. at 23-24 (explaining background of conflict concerning Klamath
River Basin).
45. See id. at 25 (stating results of study assessing validity of controversial
actions).
10
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol18/iss2/1
2007] DISCOURSES ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF SCIENCE
their professional judgment about how best to protect en-
dangered species.4
6
Demanding better science, Mooney argues, will not help the prob-
lem of "making decisions in the face of uncertainty" - it is merely
"an excuse for inaction and not a scientific endeavor at all."'47
Such criticism has been around since early in the Bush admin-
istration. President Bush almost immediately "insisted that policy
decisions . . . be made on the basis of 'sound science.' But many
scientists assert that his stance, while laudable on its face, is a pre-
text for delaying or junking scientific findings that do not support
his policy priorities. '48 Pulling out of an international global warm-
ing treaty, postponing new standards for arsenic in drinking water,
opposing fuel efficiency standards - all are signals for critics that
President Bush "selectively use[d] studies to fit [his] political
agenda and to justify its challenge to dozens of [Clinton-era] envi-
ronmental rules. '49 One group of scientists boycotted an OSHA re-
search symposium (to "review new findings relevant to reducing the
incident of 'musculoskeletal disorders' . . . in the workplace") be-
cause it would "only revisit settled science," but several "business
groups contend that the link between the injuries and workplace
conditions remain unproven."50 Similarly, a 2004 report published
by the Union of Concerned Scientists (signed by sixty highly
credentialed researchers) suggested, among other criticisms, that
the administration's calls for additional research to clarify
uncertainties about climate change served mainly to ex-
cuse not issuing mandatory regulations to cut emissions of
greenhouse gases .... [The report noted that the EPA]
removed a section on global change from one of its re-
ports after administration officials suggested changes to
emphasize the scientific uncertainties .... 51
46. See id. (describing impact of final report on ESA and agency's role in poli-
cies) (citations omitted).
47. See id. (listing issues which would remain despite meeting requirements in
ESA).
48. See Jeffrey Brainard, How Sound is Bush's 'Sound Science'?, CHRON. HIGH.
ED., Mar. 5, 2004, at A18 (describing criticism of "sound science" requirement).
49. See Eric Pianin, Science Used as Tool for Politics - Bush Camp Accused of Mak-
ing Studies Fit Agenda, WASH. PosT, May 5, 2002, at A21 (indicating increasingly
controversial use of science policy by Bush administration).
50. See Brainard, supra note 48, at 18 (discussing usefulness of regulations
concerning workplace conditions).
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Finally, two scientists criticized the administration's approval of the
Nevada Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository "in the face of the
scientific uncertainties about the site." 52
The latter controversy seems to present a reverse phenomenon
- scientific critics are claiming uncertainty and the need for more
research, while the administration is claiming settled science! For
the critics, however, Yucca Mountain exemplifies the political insta-
bility of the term "sound science," which is selectively invoked "to
protect business and industry from the costs and changes suggested
by scientific findings."53 Nevertheless, the Yucca Mountain contro-
versy is an anomaly in the discourse concerning "sound science"
because it is perhaps the administration that is recognizing the in-
evitable uncertainties of science and expressing a modest view of
science. The usual connotation of "sound science" concerns an ide-
alized view of science and the invocation of unreasonably high
standards.
D. Demands for "Sound Science"
There is broad agreement that regulatory decisions about
the environment, safety, and health should be based on
evidence. But pressures for ever-increasing documenta-
tion, review, and "sound science" have been used to create
unreasonable standards of evidence, interfering with the
government's task of protecting the public. 54
Examples of "sound science" initiatives include not only in-
creased demands for data quality and integrity (discussed below),
but also preferences for empirical, field tested and peer-reviewed
data in, for example, endangered species protection.
This may seem innocuous, but scientists read the language
as a stealthy attempt to ban one of the most reliable tech-
niques they have for understanding the vulnerability of
species: population modeling, which projects current data
into the future and is thus neither exclusively empirical
nor field-tested (though the initial data has to come from
the field). "When they start [preferring field-testing and
52. See Pianin, supra note 49, at A21 (quoting Rodney Ewing and Alison Mac-
Farlane, Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain, Sci. (April 2002)) (addressing debate
about Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository).
53. See Brainard, supra note 48, at 18 (articulating adversary opinion regard-
ing president's motivation for insistence on additional research).
54. See Neff & Goldman, supra note 26, at S81 (noting delay in health-protec-
tive regulations due to demands for sound science).
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peer review,] that is a total misrepresentation of how sci-
ence goes," said [biologist] Gordon Orians . . . "If you're
going to say, 'we can't use models,' you might as well shut
down the scientific enterprise .... 55
In another formulation, "sound science" is "shorthand for a narrow
definition of what counts as scientific evidence," which definition
might "rely on epidemiology . . . and . . .dismiss animal studies
.... "56 " [T] his narrow definition... leaves out vast areas of scien-
tific knowledge and inquiry and many legitimate tools of investiga-
tion. Scientists themselves rely on animal studies, models,
systematic field observation, and even causal observations .. .57
The concern in the regulatory arena is that legitimate science can
be excluded by stakeholders for whom it is inconvenient.
Demands for sound science appear in various regulatory con-
texts. In a proposed amendment to Tennessee's version of Medi-
caid (TennCare), which provides reimbursement for "medically
necessary" services, medical procedures that are "experimental or
investigational" would not qualify as necessary:58
A medical item or service is experimental or investiga-
tional if there is inadequate empirically-based objective
clinical scientific evidence of its safety and effectiveness for
the particular use in question. This standard is not satis-
fied by a provider's subjective clinical judgment... or by a
reasonable medical or clinical hypothesis based on an ex-
trapolation from use in another setting or from use in di-
agnosing or treating another condition. 59
The sound science requirement functions here as a strategy to
avoid reimbursement for a vast array of conventional medical
procedures.
Finally, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 is famous for its
requirement that funding for educational research will be limited
to "scientifically-based research," which is defined narrowly as re-
55. See Mooney, supra note 43, at 24 (quoting Gordon Orians, a biologist at
the University of Washington in Seattle and chairman of National Academics of
Sciences Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology).
56. See Carolyn Raffensperger & Nancy Meyers, Science and Environmental
Health Network, Detox for Torts: How to Bring Justice Back to the Tort System - Part I,
THE NETWORKER, June 2003 (explaining meaning of "sound science").
57. See id. (highlighting misleading nature of "sound science" phrase).
58. See H.B. 3513, 104th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005) (providing
proposed amendment to Tenncare Demonstration Project).
59. See id. (clarifying TennCare will not provide payment for medical services
that are experimental or investigational).
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search that employs a quantitative methodological approach. 60
While many welcome the demand for "rigorous education science"
to replace education research based on "fad, fancy, and personal
bias,"61 critics "see the conceptions of scientific educational re-
search that have emerged as retrograde, aimed at reinstating exper-
imental-quantitative methods, especially the randomized or "true"
experiment, as the "gold standard" of educational science and, in
the process, rendering qualitative methods auxiliary and epistemo-
logically second-rate." 62 Margaret Eisenhart, for example, who
finds the reinstatement of this "gold standard" exemplified in the
No Child Left Behind Act, argues that "experimental methods are a
powerful tool for addressing precisely defined causal questions but
exist alongside other, equally legitimate research questions and
methods of addressing them." 63 Thomas Schwandt likewise sug-
gests that "experimental as well as fieldwork methods, qualitative as
well as quantitative data, and narrative as well as statistical forms of
analysis and reporting are important in understanding social real-
ity."6 4 Schwandt sees the hierarchical move toward quantitative
preferences as an example of "the Bush administration's insertion
of itself into various venues in order to spin, suppress, and manipu-
late the findings of scientific investigations on a variety of topics -
all in the name of scientific integrity."65
E. Manufacturing Uncertainty
There is some dissonance between the discourse of magnifying
uncertainty and the discourse of manufacturing uncertainty. After
all, if uncertainty is a conventional aspect of normal science, then
the abuse on the part of those who make unreasonable demands of
science is in highlighting uncertainty as if it signals bad science. In
that case, "we need a new conception of science, one based on cop-
ing with uncertainty rather than pretending to be achieving perfect
certainty."66 But David Michaels, in a move that parallels the cri-
60. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
61. See Kenneth R. Howe, The Education Science Question: A Symposium, 55
EDUC. THEORY 235, 240 (2005) (discussing Thomas Schwandt's representation of
position in support of "scientific" educational research of federal government's
Institute of Education Sciences and What Works Clearinghouse).
62. See id. at 235 (discussing federal government's forceful insertion of itself
into largely autonomous arena of research methodology).
63. See id. at 236 (discussing Eisenhart's views).
64. See id. at 240 (quoting Thomas Schwandt).
65. See id. at 241 (discussing Schwandt's views).
66. SeeJEROME RAVETZ, THE No-NONSENSE GUIDE TO SCIENCE, 82 (2005) (sug-
gesting new way of thinking about science).
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol18/iss2/1
2007] DISCOURSES ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF SCIENCE 199
tique of demands for sound science, has popularized the term
"manufacturing uncertainty" to claim that "industry . . . has mas-
tered the art of manufacturing uncertainty, of demanding often im-
possible proof over common-sense precaution in the realm of
public health."67 Michaels seems to use the term "manufacturing
uncertainty" with reference to regulatory fields in which there is
little uncertainty; therefore the uncertainty must be created. 68 His
examples include (1) the tobacco industry, which in the face of "in-
exorable" science "conjured their own studies with questionable
data and forgone conclusions" and (2) the campaign to start a de-
bate over the OSHA standard for beryllium exposure, even though
for "many years it has been clear that workers exposed to beryllium
levels below the federal... standard can develop chronic beryllium
disease." 69
Other examples that fit the notion of creating uncertainty in
the face of compelling evidence include the aspirin industry's de-
mands for more proof before acknowledging the risk of Reye's syn-
drome 70 and employment of similar strategies by the lead, chemical
and asbestos industries. 71 Indeed, according to David Michaels, it is
now "rare for proposed regulations not to be challenged with claims
that the scientific evidence is flawed or otherwise imperfect."72
Moreover, manufactured uncertainty "has achieved a new level of
official respectability in the Data Quality Act, which ... allows par-
ties subject to regulation to challenge every piece of evidence con-
sidered by regulators. 73
67. See David Michaels, The Art of Manufacturing Uncertainty,' L.A. TIMES, June
24, 2005, at B1I (explaining how uncertainty is easily manipulated).
68. See id. (discussing manufactured uncertainty).
69. See id. (naming fields where manufacturing uncertainty is created).
70. See David Michaels & Celeste Monforten, Manufacturing Uncertainty: Con-
tested Science and the Protection of the Public's Health and Environment, 95 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH, Supp. 1, S39 (2005) (discussing proof before acknowledging risk of
Reye's syndrome). "Although ... four studies were enough for the [Centers for
Disease Control] to issue warnings, the industry raised 17 specific 'flaws' in the
studies and insisted that more reliable studies were needed to establish a causal
association between aspirin and Reye's syndrome." Id.
71. See id. at S41 (listing instances where manufacturing uncertainty is
created).
72. See David Michaels, Scientific Evidence and Public Policy, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH, Supp. 1, S5, S6 (2005) (emphasizing prevalence of uncertainty).
73. See id. (showing prevalence of manufactured uncertainty requiring
scrutiny).
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F. Information Quality and Scientific Peer Review
The tide and language of the [2001 Data Quality Act] sug-
gest that the law is designed to improve the quality of data
used by the government to make decisions .... [I]t is
hard to oppose "data quality[,]" [but] critics of the law as-
sert that the law is ... designed ... to transform the gov-
ernment's policies by changing the information upon
which the government can rely to make decisions.74
Critics of the Data Quality Act (the Act) point out that this new
"tool in the arsenal" of those who oppose or want to delay health
regulations was "slipped into" an appropriation bill and "sand-
wiched between" unrelated provisions without hearings or debate. 75
The Act requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
issue guidelines providing "policy and procedural guidance to fed-
eral agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity,
utility and integrity of information . . . disseminated by federal
agencies. '76 The OMB Guidelines issued in 2002 require relevant
agencies to establish procedures to allow persons to seek correc-
tions of information that is disseminated but does not meet the
data quality standards. 77 Since the Act was passed, "businesses have
frequently challenged precautionary decisions by government agen-
cies by arguing that the data on which the agencies are relying to
support their decisions does not meet the quality standards of the
law."78 In 2004, the OMB issued its "Final Information Quality Bul-
letin for Peer Review," setting standards for peer review of "scien-
tific information the agency reasonably can determine will have or
74. See Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science" Law: Reforming the Infor-
mation Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 41 (2006) (discussing law ensuring accu-
rate data used by government). The Data Quality Act (or Information Quality Act)
was enacted as section 515 of the Treasury and Government Appropriations Act of
2001 (PL 106-54, H.R. 5658). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as
directed by the Act, published final guidelines to implement section 515 in 66 Fed.
Reg. 49718 (Sept. 28, 2001).
75. See Michaels & Monforton, supra note 70, at S44 (showing existence of
skepticism).
76. See Information Quality Act of 2001, 114 Stat. 2763A-15-154 (Dec. 21,
2000), § 515(a) (providing guidelines ensuring accurate data).
77. See 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 22, 2002) (providing more stringent
requirements).
78. SeeJohnson, supra note 74, at 42 (offering example of challenge, by Com-
petitive Enterprise Institute, to National Assessment on Climate Change, report
issued by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)). The
NOAA report concluded that "global warming is likely to lead to temperature in-
creases, increased flooding and drought, plant and animal migrations, and coastal
erosion." Id.
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does have a clear and substantial impact on important public poli-
cies or private sector decisions."79 According to critics, this "formal
peer review process is designed to delay rules and regulations that
might affect business. It is designed to require science to prove
harm beyond a shadow of a doubt before anything can be done by
government to prevent it."80 Because the OMB Guidelines "limit
the information agencies use to justify environmental controls and
.. make it more difficult.. . to impose those controls on regulated
industries," the Data Quality Act arguably should be repealed.81
On the other side of this debate, supporters claim that "all the
Data Quality Act does ... is allow the public to question the reliabil-
ity of scientific data used to establish public policy."8 2 As to peer
review requirements:
Critics cite potential regulatory delays and a new level of
intrusion of. . . OMB into agency decision-making ....
But [peer review] may help ensure that basic scientific and
technical conclusions are formulated more objectively,
with an early and complete record of what a broader
range of independent scientists think about the science
behind new federal initiatives.83
Supporters say we should welcome an information "due process"
movement that promises transparency and unbiased, unconflicted
selection of peer reviewers. 84 After all, "public review of data and
methodology is crucial for both good science and good public pol-
icy. Scientific data collected by federal agencies have often been
subjected to independent review and found to be in error ....
[I]ndependent review will help society avoid costly public policy
mistakes." 85 Examples of such public policy mistakes arguably in-
79. See 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2667 (Jan. 14, 2005) (providing OMB's final bulle-
tin on improving quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information dissemi-
nated by federal government to public).
80. See Carolyn Raffensperger, Why Industry Wants Rules Peer Reviewed, THE
ENv. FORUM, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 12 (providing opposing policy views).
81. SeeJohnson, supra note 74, at 79-80 (noting that OMB Guidelines pressure
agencies to ignore data they would otherwise consider).
82. See Mark Hansen, Science Experiment: Industries Are Using a Landmark Case
and a 2001 Law to Block Regulation, Critics Say, A.B.A.J., Nov. 2005, at 12 (explaining
opinions of proponents of Data Quality Act). Steven Milloy states, "We view [the
Act] as a way of checking up on the people who want to use junk science to regu-
late the way we live." Id.
83. Frederick R. Anderson, Peer Review of Data, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 2003, at 1
(referring to Sept. 15, 2003, OMB bulletin, 66 Fed. Reg. 54023).
84. See id. (encouraging independent and external peer review).
85. See Michael Gough & Steven Milloy, The Case for Public Access to Federally
Funded Research Data, Executive Summary No. 366, Cato Institute, Feb. 2, 2000, at 1
17
Caudill: Images of Expertise: Converging Discourses on the Use and Abuse o
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
202 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII: p. 185
clude EPA regulation of airborne asbestos, the panic over endo-
crine disruptors and the controversy over the herbicide 2, 4-D. 86
Finally, "because regulatory agencies are rarely penalized for erro-
neous science, they are less motivated to ensure that the science
they use is valid."'8 7 Hence the need for public review to correct
regulatory abuse.
G. Right-Wing Stories of Regulatory Abuse
Today, we are not only dealing with out-of-control regula-
tory agencies, but we are also dealing with bureaucrats
who disagree with each other and solve their disputes by
implementing duplicative regulation .... We have had
fifty-plus years of regulatory growth and, as President Rea-
gan said, "the hardest thing to kill is a government pro-
gram once it has been created."88
According to Steven Milloy, a 1999 EPA proposal to reduce
tailpipe emissions from sport utility vehicles was based on a single
study that was (1) financed by the EPA; (2) published in a journal
that receives EPA subsidies and lobbies for stricter air pollution reg-
ulations; and (3) not "science at all - it's simply a statistical analysis
of questionable data . 8.."89 According to Bonner Cohen, the EPA
in 1998 ignored independent, peer-reviewed science when it in-
sisted on a zero (instead of 300 parts per billion) standard for chlo-
roform in drinking water, which meant that "water system operators
[would] devote their limited resources to combating the fictitious
risks posed by disinfectant by-products .... "90 According to Dennis
Avery, a May 30, 2000 executive order to save the Gulf of Mexico
fisheries from fertilizer run-off ignored the fact that it would likely
starve the fishery and reduce the efficiency of Midwestern corn
fields, even though current nutrient flows appeared to cause "no
(expressing support for Shelby Amendment which gives public greater access to
data in published reports and federal regulations).
86. See id. at 3-10 (discussing examples in further detail).
87. See id. at 3 (explaining why public must check science).
88. See Senator Jim Inhofe, INTRODUCTION TO BIG GOVERNMENT AND BAD Sci-
ENCE: TEN CASES IN REGULATORY ABUSE (Bonner R. Cohen & Thomas A. Giovanetti
eds., 1999) (joint publication of Institute for Policy Innovation and the Lexington
Institute) (criticizing current state of regulatory agencies).
89. See Steven J. Milloy, SUVs: Another Case of Missing EPA Data, in BIG GOVERN-
MENT, supra note 88, at 3 (discussing problems with "Pope" study).
90. See Bonner R. Cohen, Safe Drinking Water: Politics Trumps Science, in BIG
GOVERNMENT, supra note 88, at 8 (noting zero standard is unattainable and
irrational).
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economic or ecological damage."9' Likewise, Bonner Cohen ar-
gues that EPA plans to rid the Hudson River of PCBs, by declaring
parts of the river to be Superfund clean-up sites, would only "stir
[the PCBs] up, thereby defeating the purpose of the whole
exercise." 92
These and other similar stories93 are promulgated by the Insti-
tute for Policy Innovation, which focuses on harnessing the
strengths of "individual choice" and "free markets," and by the Lex-
ington Institute, which "believes in limiting the role of the federal
government" and "opposes the unnecessary intrusion of the federal
government into the commerce and culture of the nation .... ,,
to suggest that politics (particularly in the past Clinton administra-
tion) often trumps science. Such approaches feed into a narrative
(concerning regulatory abuse) that will join the renewed debate
over global warming in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA.
H. Getting Politics Out of Science
[A]ffected parties who are not burdened with scientific
scruples can make sound science appear controversial by
challenging individual methodological decisions, even
when scientists themselves would find the choices neces--
sary and appropriate. Affected parties can also conduct
ends-oriented research, replete with undisclosed method-
ological and design decisions selected precisely because
they produce a desired, predetermined result.95
Interest, it seems, is in the eye of the beholder. Those con-
cerned with regulatory abuse, discussed in the previous section, re-
fer to those who have been the recipients of generous grants from
the EPA96 and "private researchers" [who conduct studies] courtesy
91. See Dennis Avery, Hypoxia: The Dead Zone Lives, in BIG GOVERNMENT, supra
note 88, at 9 (stating that bureaucrats, scientists, and special interest groups ig-
nored pertinent information).
92. See Bonner R. Cohen, PCBs: EPA Occupies the Hudson Valley, in Bic GovERN-
MENT, supra note 88, at 16 (noting that if left alone, problem would fix itself).
93. See generally BIG GOVERNMENT, supra note 88 (suggesting that government
regulation has become excessive).
94. See id. at 24 (stating Institute's mission).
95. See Wendy Wagner, The Perils of Relying on Interested Parties to Evaluate Scien-
tific Quality, 95 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH, Supp. 1, S99 (2005) (noting ability of affected
parties to discredit and manipulate research for their own benefit).
96. See Cohen, Safe Drinking Water, supra note 90, at 8 (referring to Washing-
ton-based environmental groups).
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of a grant from the EPA,97 as biased or interested scientists, as op-
posed to "independent" scientists "outside the agency."98 From the
opposite perspective, it is the use of interest groups to review the
quality of the science within agencies that presents the greater
challenge:
Until the late 1990s, science advisory boards and
agency peer-review processes provided the primary source
of advice on scientific quality for agencies engaged in sci-
ence-based regulation. This "expert" model helped to vet
and anchor the relevant science through a balanced com-
mittee or group of scientists before subjecting it to the ad-
versarial, ends-oriented attacks of stakeholders.99
In this view, "disinterested" scientists were used to confirm the qual-
ity and validity of technical research, and thereafter the agency
would solicit "input from interest groups and [the] affected public
on how the science should be used for policy." 100 Nowadays, how-
ever, there is a
shift towards using interest groups for both functions - the
evaluation of scientific quality, as well as how that science
should be used in public policy - without soliciting the
advice or input of the scientific community .... [I] n many
cases these new processes that solicit interest group review
of scientific quality effectively eliminate the need to con-
sult with experts .... [I]nterest groups are portrayed as
legitimate and constructive sources of scientific quality.10 1
This picture presents an interesting, and somewhat idealistic, vision
of science in the regulatory process. "Interest" exists among stake-
holders, outside the agency, who await the scientific judgments of
disinterested "experts" working for the agency; interest groups here
are the opposite of experts, as if interest groups do not rely on legit-
imate science, and "adversarial challenges" become the opposite of
97. See Milloy, supra note 85, at 3 (discussing auto emissions study produced
by private researchers funded by EPA).
98. See Cohen, Safe Drinking Water, supra note 90, at 7 (discussing EPA's rejec-
tion of mutual conclusion between both EPA and unaffiliated scientists).
99. See Wagner, supra note 95, at S100 (explaining role of interest group in
setting standard for scientific quality).
100. See id. at S99 (identifying two-tier structure where interest groups com-
ment on political implementation of experts' scientific conclusions).
101. See id. at S100 (noting trend toward permitting interest groups to both
establish scientific quality and opine on policy implementation).
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"expert consensus," as if scientists are never adversarial.10 2 "Relying
on affected parties and adversarial processes for the review of scien-
tific quality violates one of the fundamental tenets of science,
namely that scientific research, as well as peer review of that re-
search, should be unbiased, objective, and disinterested. '" 10 3 Con-
trast this aphorism with the accusation that scientists receiving EPA
grants are biased and interested, 10 4 and you have a contested dis-
course in which both sides appeal to the same idealistic view of sci-
ence - the only difference is who you characterize as a biased
stakeholder (the EPA or big business), which scientists are biased
(those funded by the EPA or by "private" sources) and what consti-
tutes "independence" (freedom from agency or industry group
politics).
Donald Elliott, former EPA General Counsel from 1989-91,
tries to help matters by appealing to science as the opposite of polit-
ics: "[V] ery few knowledgeable persons would contend that our en-
vironmental decisions today are too much dominated by neutral
scientific expertise and do not reflect politics .... My belief is that
there is currently too much politics and not enough science
.... "105 Elliott recognizes that his appeal to the "common sense"
category of "science" is problematic, but he dismisses (as "fine phil-
osophical questions that [others] discuss at length") concerns "with
the nature of science, whether all scientists must agree, whether sci-
ence is 'objective', [or] for that matter, whether science actually
exists.' 0 6 He then proposes, in a "thoroughly conventional" fash-
ion, the creation of a "high level advocate for science" (a "chief
science officer" to ensure scientific integrity) and a "Science Watch"
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to represent disinterested
scientists who have no financial stakes in the administration pro-
cess: "Perhaps it is time for science qua science to get into the
game by organizing . . . independent environmental scientists
whose only common interest is speaking up for the integrity of sci-
ence in the process." 10 7 Such idealism, albeit guarded (e.g., "objec-
102. See id. (discussing relationship between interest groups, experts and sci-
entific conclusions).
103. See id. at S101 (stating research and review must be unbiased, objective
and disinterested).
104. For a discussion of research conducted by interested scientists, see supra
and infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
105. SeeE. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 45, 49 (2003) (discussing tension between politics and experts in science).
106. See id. at 47 (regarding arguments not discussed).
107. See id. at 52-53, 59, 60 (proposing creation of committee focused solely
on supporting and advocating integrity of science).
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tions... are obvious," "[W] ho can be so audacious as to purport to
speak for science?" "science is not totally objective, nor does it pro-
vide definitive answers to all definitive questions"), serves to intro-
duce my final discourse relevant to Massachusetts v. EPA, namely the
discourse of science studies.
I. Science Studies and Law
The discipline of "science studies," referred to as the "sociology
of scientific knowledge" or "science and technology studies" or the
"history, philosophy, and sociology of science," is associated with
the study of scientific progress and practices in their social, histori-
cal, and institutional contexts.10 8 Because scholars in science stud-
ies typically attend to the rhetorical and social aspects of a scientific
field, such as advocacy and consensus-building techniques on the
part of scientists, rather than focusing on the more conventional
aspects of science, such as observation of natural phenomenon, sci-
ence studies has been criticized for viewing scientific facts as "social
constructions" rather than as stable, cumulative bits of knowledge
about nature.1 09
Recent work in science studies [, however,] has confirmed
that the polarization between utter faith and confidence
in science, on the one hand, and criticism of science as a
social construction, on the other, is unnecessary. Science
is the product of both (i) observation and experiment with
respect to natural reality, and (ii) norms, conventions, and
expectations within the scientific community. 110
The picture of science that emerges from such a conception is prag-
matic rather than idealistic. Without denying scientific progress
and utility on many fronts, science can be viewed (1) as a social
practice reflecting the scientific community's goals and standards;
(2) as a dynamic practice evolving on the basis of reasonable beliefs
108. See generally David S. Caudill, Law, Science, and Science Studies: Contrasting
the Deposition of a Scientific Expert with Ethnographic Studies of Scientific Practice, 12
S.CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 85, 88-92 (2002); David S. Caudill, Law and Science: An Essay
on Links and Socio-Natural Hybrids, 51 SvRACUSE L. REV. 841, 853-61 (2001); David S.
Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Expertise
and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 726-36 (2000)
(discussing socio-natural hybrids for science and law).
109. See generally DAVID S. CAUDILL & L.H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND: THE
IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAw, xv-xvi (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2006) (comparing multiple views of science studies).
110. See id. (arguing multidimensional aspect of science studies including
both social and experimental elements).
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and resolution of internal debates; and (3) as a professional prac-
tice reflecting authority structures and institutions, as well as eco-
nomic and political interests and limitations."1
This discourse concerning the pragmatic features and limita-
tions of science is interwoven with the others discussed in this sec-
tion, insofar as it conflicts with idealized views of science, including
unrealistically high standards for certainty in the regulatory arena,
as well as unrealistically high standards for "disinterested" science.
The literature of science studies could potentially have an impact in
regulatory debates by demonstrating that all science is interested in
some respect (and therefore that "interested" science is not unrelia-
ble for that reason). There is some concern, however, that
[c]redible studies, traditional research methods, and
respected researchers . . . may all be deconstructed if
those judging or scrutinizing the science do not respect
the vulnerable, socially constructed features of traditional
research methods .... [E]stablished scientific communi-
ties informally agree on "accepted methods," some of
which are necessarily based on consensual, but technically
invalidated, assumptions. If a court or agency is unaware
or unconcerned about the necessity of these constructed
features of science, attacks against the accepted conven-
tions are likely to succeed. 112
In other words, until judges understand the tentative aspects of
science, arguments based on idealized views of science remain
compelling.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to suggest, in opposition to those
who dismissively identify Massachusetts v. EPA as an ordinary, vanilla
case of regulatory review without any striking features, that the con-
troversy represents much more than that. The debate in the D.C.
Court of Appeals over uncertainty - is uncertainty a normal fea-
ture of useful science, or a signal to wait for, and demand more,
certainty in science? - is a point of convergence for numerous de-
bates about the uses and abuses of science in law. The debate over
the causes of global warming, at least in its legal version, has every-
thing to do with the contested images of science in our culture.
111. See id. at 24 (discussing varying conceptualizations of scientific study).
112. See Wagner, supra note 95, at S102 (considering result of disregarding
.accepted methods" of scientific research for defined validation of results).
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